New comparable data on ownership and control and financing patterns shows that the emerging capitalist systems in Central and Eastern Europe share many features. While
Introduction
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe have pursued remarkably different policies and followed strikingly different trajectories. Despite these differences the structures of their financial systems are rapidly converging. The contours of postsocialist capitalism are emerging, and the specific challenges of corporate governance are becoming clearer. The purpose of this article is to characterize the main features of the corporate governance challenge facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and to suggest the thrust of policy intervention.
New comparable data on ownership and control and financing patterns shows that the emerging capitalist systems share many features.
1 While the extent of remaining government ownership differs from one country to another, private ownership dominates everywhere. Ownership and control are becoming increasingly concentrated, with the emergence of corporate groupings and significant foreign owners in most countries. As firms grow in size, ownership and control are separated, primarily using pyramids. Like on the rest of the European continent, firms often have a second large shareholder. Most firms in Central and Eastern Europe are still ownermanaged, but professional management is becoming more common. However, even in firms with professional managers controlling shareholders play a critical role.
Moreover, for better or for worse, large shareholders are also playing and will most likely continue to play a role beyond their immediate mandate and influence the course of politics, in particular in shaping the rules pertaining to corporate governance and financial sector development.
The emerging ownership and control structures have important implications for corporate governance. In owner-managed firms the fundamental tradeoff is between providing incentives to entrepreneurship and protection of minority investors. The 1 We draw on data collected within the European Corporate Governance Network for all the accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This data follows the blueprint set up by a similar data exercise for Western Europe and reported in Barca and Becht (2001) . We provide detailed and comparable information on the size of controlling blocks in individual firms in most countries. The data is supplemented with indicators of the legal and general institutional environment, including enforcement variables, and specific information on rules relevant to corporate governance. data and rich anectodal evidence from these countries suggest that strengthening minority protection is of paramount importance in combating fraud and bringing down financing costs. The main concern of this policy priority is that protection of minorities in incumbents in takeovers may discourage strategic investors and badly needed restructuring in these countries. The mandatory bid rule requiring owners with large controlling stakes to buy out remaining shareholders also forces firms to delist, undermining the sustainability of these fledgling stock markets.
As controlling owners gradually distance themselves from day-to-day management in favor of professional managers, the nature of the corporate governance problem changes. Managers must be monitored and only controlling owners have sufficient incentives to perform this task. Even in these firms the main corporate governance conflict remains that between controlling owners and minority investors. But the key tradeoff is one between providing controlling owners with incentives to monitor and protecting minority investors. Once the worst forms of fraud have been contained, excessive emphasis on minority protection would reinforce the informational advantage of management.
The importance of monitoring by the large shareholder is reinforced by the weakness of other mechanisms for corporate governance. With strongly concentrated ownership and control, hostile takeovers and proxy fights are largely ineffective as disciplining devices. Similarly, boards of directors cannot be expected to play an independent role and the role of executive compensation schemes is more limited in companies controlled by a single shareholder. Moreover, litigation is unlikely to be a successful, or reliable, mechanism in environments of weak legal enforcement, and large commercial banks have yet to become deeply involved in financing the corporate sector.
But the current weakness of these supplementary mechanisms does not imply that efforts should not be made to develop them. In the medium-run there is some hope that increasing involvement of commercial banks will provide some monitoring. Over time improved financing opportunities can increase competition in the market for corporate control and help improve contestability. As the legal environments improve, in particular with respect to enforcement, there is some hope that litigation could also become a mechanism contributing to better corporate governance.
The regulatory response to the emerging ownership and control structures has largely been determined by the process of accession to the European Union. Regulators have emulated existing institutions in current member states and to some extent anticipated possible regulation at the EU level. As a result, the Central and Eastern European countries have adopted regulations that on paper are stronger minority protection than most EU countries. However, in implementation of existing regulation efforts are made to maintain the incentives for active controlling shareholders. For example, the interpretation of the mandatory bid rule appears to be very lax in several countries, leaving more possibilities for a control premium and facilitating block trades.
We start in Section 2 by describing some current features of the institutional environment of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Section 3 documents the strong concentration of ownership and control in listed firms, but also identifies some differences in patterns across countries. In Section 4 we attempt to define main features of the corporate governance problem(s) facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and discuss the implications for the regulatory tradeoffs they are facing. Section 5 concludes.
The Institutional Backdrop

The Emerging Financial Architecture
Financial sector transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy involved transforming a single institution responsible for monetary policy and commercial banking, the so-called monobank, into a decentralized financial system integrated into a market economy. After an initial phase of similar measures to break-up the monobank and dealing with the heritage of central planning the countries chose very different policies and followed different trajectories of financial development. A "Great Divide" opened up between those countries that managed to establish a sound institutional foundation, resist pressures to bailout firms, and enforce contracts, and those that did not. Interestingly, the countries that made it to the "right" side of the divide have combined managed to combine fiscal and monetary responsibility with the enforcement of contracts (Berglof and Bolton, 2002) .
The more successful countries in Central and Eastern Europe followed very different financial development policies. This applies to procedures for restructuring bad loans, privatization strategies for enterprises and banks, policy towards foreign entry in the banking sector, regulatory barriers to entry of new banks, and policies toward stock market development all differed markedly. In particular, countries in transition opted for very different strategies for privatizing state-owned enterprises. For example, Hungary started privatization early and followed a case-by-case sales method, while the Czech Republic opted for a mass voucher privatization scheme. Poland was slow in implementing mass privatization, but in the meantime a large number of individual firms were privatized through management buyouts and liquidation schemes.
Development paths also differed markedly. Table 1 shows the development of domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. This standard but very poor measure indicates that only in Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia did credit expand relatively steadily. The Czech Republic had a very high stock of credit early on, reflecting the mass privatization of enterprises and extensive bad loans, rather than financial development.
After several banking crises during the first half of the 1990s credit dropped from 45 percent of GDP in 1990 to 25 percent in 1994. Since then its level of credit has expanded in step with economic growth. Similarly, Latvia and Lithuania also recovered after initial banking crises.
[ In other countries the link between finance and growth is even weaker. Bulgaria experienced rapid growth in credit in the mid-1990s and then a drastic fall in the late 1990s, but its economy declined or showed moderate growth over this time period. In Russia, financial markets developed rapidly and credit to households and enterprises increased somewhat in the late 1990s, while the economy continued to stagnate. The financial crisis in August 1998 had little long-term impact on real growth. Ukraine, and many other countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, did not see any financial development of note.
The financial sectors of these countries have converged. They are now strongly dominated by, mainly foreign-controlled, banks lending primarily to governments and other financial institutions. Banks provide some working capital finance to the corporate sector, but so far have played a limited role in financing investments. Investment finance comes almost exclusively from retained earnings, and most external finance comes through foreign direct investment. The difference between lending and borrowing rates have declined significantly in level and volatility in most countries of central and Eastern
Europe, but they remain high by the standards of developed market economies.
Important weaknesses in the institutional environment, particularly as regards the enforcement of laws and regulation, have yet to be addressed. The process of accession to the European Union is providing useful pressure to bring this process forward.
The Emergence -and Eclipse -of Stock Markets
Countries established stock exchanges at different points of the transition process.
Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria 2 , Poland and Russia opened their stock markets very early (1990) (1991) , and the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania followed in 1993.
Trading on Latvian and Romanian stock exchanges started in mid 1995, while Estonia did not open up the stock exchange until spring 1996.
The countries followed very different policies towards stock market development in the early stages of transition (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000) . This variation can to a large extent be explained by differences in the privatization policies pursued in the countries. Most of the listed companies are privatized firms, rather than new startups. Table 2 shows the development of number of shares in the stock markets.
[ The development of market capitalization also reflects the chosen privatization method. In countries that followed more gradual privatization, equity market capitalization increased slowly (e.g. Poland, Hungary), while in countries with rapid mass privatization, market capitalization jumped to very high levels and then decreased due to de-listing of illiquid shares (e.g. the Czech Republic).
By the end of 2000 stock market capitalization was the highest in Russia (see Table   3 ), followed by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The rest of the stock markets in the region are negligible, partly due to the small size of the country (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) or poor regulatory framework (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine). Nonetheless, even the largest stock exchanges in transition economies are relatively small on a world scale (see comparison with other world markets in Table 3 ). It is interesting to note that the market capitalization figures for the front-runners in transition countries are similar to those of Portugal and Greece (the youngest members of the EU) in the mid-1990s.
The stock markets are also small relative to the size of the economies (Table 4 shows the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, a ratio widely used in cross-country studies to proxy for stock market development). In four countries -the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania 6 -the market capitalization to GDP is above 20 per cent. This level compares to Greece and Portugal in the mid 1990s and is slightly below the respective figure in Germany. Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, on the other hand have very low (below 10%) market capitalization to GDP ratios.
[ ones, and are subject to more stringent supervision and scrutiny by the public. Third, ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated, and as most of the countries have introduced mandatory bid rules 9 owners passing a certain threshold must offer to buy the entire firm. As a result they must leave the stock exchange (because one of the listing requirements is that a certain minimum of shares (e.g. 25%) must be in public circulation). We will return to how the regulatory authorities have tried to mitigate the negative effects of the mandatory bid rule through lax enforcement.
From "Law-on-the-Books" to Enforcement
Investor protection in corporate law and securities markets regulation differ considerably across countries. Pistor (2000) provide a standardized comparison of 'law-on-the-books' using an aggregated variable, stock market integrity, covering the conflict of interest rules, the independence of shareholder registers, insider trading rules, mandatory disclosure threshold, state control of capital market supervision agency and the independence of capital market supervision (Table 5) [ These two variables do not provide an idea on how these laws are actually implemented, supervised, and enforced. The EBRD evaluation of commercial law and financial regulations extensiveness and effectiveness attempts to capture these aspects. Table 6 for years 1998 and 2000 show enforcement (effectiveness) is lagging behind the extensiveness. Enforcement of financial regulations was particularly behind, but at the same time it also improved the most in period from 1998 to 2000.
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The poor functioning of the court system is still not working efficiently and is characterized by high level of corruption. The World Bank BEEPS study shows that companies have rather little trust in the judiciary system (Table 7) . We observe that, for example, the Central Bank has considerably higher rating than the courts. The evaluation of fairness, honesty and enforceability in legal systems is rather poor. The shaded countries -the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, (and Russia and Ukraine) -have lower than average evaluation in all categories (except quality of Central Bank for Latvia). This shows that companies in these five countries are more pessimistic (as compared to their counterparts in other sample countries) about the overall efficiency, fairness, honesty and enforceability of the legal system in particular countries. Kaufmann et al. (2002) Slovenia score the highest. Table 8 shows that the average regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption in transition economies is well below the averages in developed markets. However there is huge variation within the sample countries -the best performing transition countries score higher than or close to Greece (e.g. in
2000/2001 Estonia outperforms Greece in all the there categories). [TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The ten Central and Eastern European countries can roughly be classified into four groups in terms of their approach to enforcement of investor protection and securities markets regulations. The first group, Poland and Hungary, has chosen strict regulatory mechanisms aimed at investor protection from management and large blockholder fraud. These two countries have also put considerable effort into enforcement mechanisms, often the most deficient part of the legal framework in transition economies. Comparing these two countries, Hungary has weaker regulation than
Poland, but its stock market performance is boosted by the specific choice of privatization method, relying heavily on sales of controlling stakes to foreigners. This method has increased foreign control of local companies and helped generate interest in these stocks, bringing more liquidity to the market. Slovenia stands out in this discussion. The Slovenian method of privatization granted large amounts of shares to employees, former employees and state-controlled public funds. Besides, Slovenian law provides employees with substantial corporate governance rights, including the representation on boards. Privatization has also proceeded more slowly, leaving substantial ownership stakes in hand of the government. The large presence of government control (in form of state controlled funds) in the Slovenian privatized corporations is a major obstacle to "normal" capital market development in Slovenia. Large state interest has also protected the capital markets from foreigners. For example, only in January 1999 were foreign banks allowed to establish branches in Slovenia, and only in July 1999 were branches and subsidiaries of foreign securities firms allowed to enter the market. As a result, even though the level of institutional and technical development of the stock market in Slovenia is quite advanced, the local market remains segmented from the world market due to capital market restrictions and a "semi-socialistic" corporate governance structure (employee and state control).
Increasingly Concentrated Ownership and Control
The emergence of stock markets and improvement of disclosure requirements for public companies facilitate the study of ownership and control patterns of companies.
The information on identity and stake of owners above a certain threshold should in principle be publicly available. In this section we present results of a joint effort of group of researchers carried out under the supervision of European Corporate
Governance Network. The data covers companies in ten Central and Eastern
European countries and relate them to comparable information for Western European companies. We also provide some illustrative examples.
Ownership and Control in Listed Companies
After a decade of transition, certain corporate governance patterns have emerged. As can be seen from Table 9 and Figure 1 , ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated, often exceeding Continental European levels. In all countries but Slovenia with its peculiar half-finished privatization, the median largest stake was 40 per cent or larger (e.g., median voting power of the largest owner in 1999 was 56% in Belgium, 54% in Austria, 52% in Italy but only 39% in Holland and 33% in Sweden 10 ). And these numbers are likely to be understated. Reporting standards in transition countries are still lagging behind. Even though formal requirements on disclosure of voting blocks (investors voting in concert) exist, in reality many owners hide behind offshore (i.e., undisclosed owner) or act together without disclosing it (based on unofficial agreements).
[ that the bidder who intended to acquire 33% + 1 share (calculated as percent of equity) had to make a mandatory bid for 50% + 1 share (Earle et al., 2001 ). This explains the clustering around 50% level in Hungary. Since July 2001 the threshold remains 33% + 1 share (although it is calculated as a percent of voting power), but the bidder has to make the mandatory bid for all voting shares.
Bulgaria is the only country with distribution above the 45° line (like in Germany),
i.e. private control bias. Again, this may be due to the fact that only direct shareholdings are reported in Bulgaria (as compared to ultimate blocks). Finally, Slovenia stands out with rather dispersed ownership (similar to U.K.), which is a result of the specific privatization method carried out in Slovenia (employee ownership funds controlled by managers).
What explains the observed increase in the concentration of ownership and control in transition economies? In part, the increasing concentration could be fictitious simply reflecting more stringent supervision of disclosure requirements forcing earlier actual owners to disclose their holdings. Nowadays the option to hide behind private unlisted companies is limited. In most countries market regulators can access the information on ownership of unlisted companies and trace any indirect holdings of main shareholders.
12 See Barca and Becht (2001) . 13 The 45° line reflects a uniform density of firms by voting blocks. A distribution above the 45° line reflects concentrated ownership -large voting blocks (private control bias) and a distribution below the 45° line indicates more dispersed voting control (management or market control bias).
There are, however, reasons to believe that ownership is indeed becoming increasingly concentrated. Poor minority shareholder protection combined with easier access to bank financing allow the largest shareholders to buy out minorities to avoid the hassle with regulators. Minority shareholders are also in many cases eager to sell their shares recognizing that they have little voice in companies' policies (regarding such things as dividends, calling extraordinary shareholder meetings or appointing independent auditors). Moreover, internal funds and bank loans often suffice to finance companies' growth.
The gradual sellout of state-owned shares is another factor that should have increased ownership concentration. Current majority owners have exploited inside knowledge and contacts to acquire state-owned shares at substantial discounts. While a large fraction of ownership still remains under state control, individuals or families control the largest stake in most of the countries.
Who Controls and How?
Unfortunately, the information on the use of mechanisms for separation of ownership and control, and linkages between owners is still poor. This section provides some scattered information and examples of who controls and how they control corporations in Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU accession countries have followed the EU directives on ownership disclosure.
As a result, the requirements for mandatory disclosure of large block holdings have improved substantially during the last couple of years. The definitions of corporate groups and related parties have become more precise. The lowest notification thresholds have decreased. In 1998, according to Pistor et al. (2000) data, only three sample countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) had the mandatory 17 Moreover, voting rights are explicitly defined, e.g., the aggregate voting rights of a person, the company controlled by this person, and a third party, who is committed, on basis of agreement, to carry out joint policies. 18 The 90 per cent threshold is optional. It provides the right for the shareholder to make a bid, but it is mandatory in a sense that without this bid it is not possible to unregister the company from the register of public companies (Tchipev, 2001) . disclosure threshold at 10% of voting rights. The rest of the countries had either higher threshold or no block ownership disclosure requirement at all. By 2002, most of the countries had adopted the 5% mandatory block holding disclosure threshold (see Table 10 ).
[ Romania). Irrespective of privatization method used, the privatization of former stateowned enterprises gave privileges to managers. As Pistor (2000) argues, incumbents who held de facto control rights had an advantage over outsiders with weak rights to protect them. Using inside knowledge and political connections many managers have become major shareholders by employing smart schemes of leveraged buy-outs, buying up employee shares at discounted prices or using other (even purely fraudulent) schemes. As a result, one of the stylized facts in transition countries is strong insider ownership and control. Given weak legislative power to protect outside investors such companies are highly unattractive to foreign and domestic minority investors.
Poland provides a rich set of illustrative examples. Many enterprises, later listed on the stock exchange, were privatized through management and employee buy-outs. For example, AGROS, a large former state-owned food processing company, was controlled by TIGA -a privatization vehicle set up by employees and managers of former state-owned enterprise (see Figure 3) . Through preferred shares (one sharefive votes) TIGA controlled 81.4% of Agros Holding's votes, while its share of cash flows was only 47.5%. In fact, full control of AGROS should be assigned to Zofia Gaber (the company's director before privatization and then the president of management board). She was also the largest owner of TIGA with 18.5% voting stake and chairwoman of TIGA supervisory board." (Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski, 2001 ).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
At the other end of the spectrum we find a strong outsider category, foreign strategic (controlling) investors, with low trust in local management. Sensitized by frequent reports on managerial fraud and entrenchment in emerging markets, foreign strategic owners come with their own management or closely supervise the day-to-day operations of local management. While potentially weakening managerial incentives and entrepreneurial spirit, as well as wasting scarce managerial time on report writing, foreign investors appear to have contributed significantly to corporate restructuring in these countries (Djankov and Murrell, 2002) .
The instruments for separating ownership and control are relatively widely used.
Dual-class shares (preferred shares) are quite common, but low-voting shares are typically preference shares (see Table 10 ). 19 Pyramidal structures are widely used in the sample countries (e.g. see Figure 4 ), mainly for two reasons -to limit the equity investment and sometimes to hide the true ownership. In most of the sample countries, the identity of the ultimate owner is still undisclosed due to the laxity in regulation or enforcement of disclosure. Crossholdings are also observed. In some countries, companies can also hold their own stock. For example, in Poland, since January 2001 any corporation is allowed to buy up to 10% of its own shares to "defend against direct, significant damage to a company" (Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski, 2001) . Recently more countries have introduced rules allowing companies, in exceptional cases, to repurchase their own stock (e.g. if that is approved by the General Meeting, if it is with the purpose to reduce the share capital, etc.), normally, not more than 10 percent of the company capital. In the original 19 Some sample countries have a legal provision stating that common (ordinary) shares carry strict one share -one vote provision, but almost all countries allow for issuance of preferred shares that can be without voting rights. Like in Russia (see footnote 23) and Lithuania, the flexibility in setting the rights for preferred shareholders in the company bylaws practically allows companies to escape the one share -one vote principle. Hungary, Poland and Latvia are examples where the law clearly provides that the superior voting right shares are allowed. There are some restrictions -in Poland, no preference share shall carry more than five votes, in Hungary -no more than 10 votes, and in Latvia the non-voting shares shall not exceed 40% of the company capital. Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovenia can be classified as having one share -one vote, because the non-voting preferred shares have strict requirements that set their preferential status to dividends, as well as prescirbe an automatic gain of voting power in one year from the time when dividends have not been distributed. The other cases are rather ambiguous.
formulations of securities laws in the sample countries most often such an action was prohibited.
[
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In addition, many corporate charters contain arrangements specifically designed to defend companies against takeovers. Voting caps are used in, among other countries, Slovenia and Poland. In Poland, there are some examples of a provision that is close to the voting cap, but in general such takeover defense is not utilized. Special shareholder agreements or golden shares are a common way to secure preferential rights when an outside bid has been launched. In the process of privatization, strategic investors may have been granted preferential rights in form of shareholder agreement.
The following example illustrates the special shareholder rights agreements.
Ventspils Nafta (VN) is the second largest (by market capitalization) company listed on Riga Stock Exchange. Its main business activities are transshipment and storage of oil products. The two largest shareholders of VN are Latvijas Naftas Tranzits (LNT) (48%) -a company owned by a group of related persons and entities including offshores (see Figure 4 ) -and the State (43.5%). The remaining State shares will be privatized, but the process is very slow due to highly politicized games around it. At the first round of privatization, LNT was granted special preferential rights, namely that it has veto power to any significant decision (e.g. strategy, dividend policy or block transfer of shares). Moreover, 5% of the company capital is reserved for LNT.
As a result, there is a very little chance that (in the remaining privatization stage) a major shareholder will emerge without an agreement with or approval of LNT.
Mandatory Bid Rule and De-Listings
The regulatory frameworks have only in part adjusted to the emerging ownership and control structures, and some of the legislation imposed through the EU accession is directly counterproductive. This is particularly true for the mandatory bid rule requiring an owner who reaches a certain threshold of control to buy out the other shareholders at the same price that he bought his controlling block. This rule makes takeovers prohibitively expensive and effectively closes down the trade in control blocks. Compared to 1998 (Pistor et al., 2000) , more countries have introduced the mandatory bid rule (MBR) recently. Meanwhile, one of the few countries that had the MBR before 1997 -Poland -raised the threshold from 33% to 50% reflecting the pressure of consolidation trend and need for slowing the withdrawal of companies from the market (Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski, 2001) . Now in most of the sample countries, mandatory share buy-back threshold is set at 50 per cent of voting rights (see Table 10 ). 20 How can it happen then that listed firms continue to be majority and supermajority held (largest owner above 75% of voting power) and there is no share buy-back triggered? We claim that this reflects intentionally weak enforcement.
We will use Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Romania as illustrative examples. In 8.5% and 6.5% of shares. The three Icelandic investors were clearly related (e.g.
being business partners in some entities in Iceland). Moreover, Iceland is not a significant foreign investor particularly favoring Latvia (for reasons of similar size or something else). Actually, Iceland as investor relates almost exclusively to the enterprises controlled by the major shareholder of Staburadze. Nevertheless, when the case was brought to the court, the FCMC was proved to be wrong -the three Icelandic investors were not related. The only sanction the FCMC could impose was to remove the company from the main list to the free (unregulated) market, thus even more dampening the chances of remaining minority shareholder in Staburadze to be protected.
In Estonia, the problem seems to be a very loose definition of mandatory share buyback rule. By law, the mandatory tender offer has to be made if a dominant position is acquired (being defined as 50% or more of voting rights). But, at the same time, the law provides numerous exceptions to this rule. Securities Market Act (Paragraph 173) stipulates that the authority (Inspectorate) has the right to grant exception (six cases)
to the requirement of mandatory tender offer if, for example, "the company acquired a dominant position over the target issuer from a company belonging to the same group with the latter and after acquiring the dominant position the company continues to belong to the same group" or "a dominant position was acquired as a result of reducing the share capital of the target issuer". Also regarding the free float requirement (Listing Rules), the Listing Committee can make exceptions. For example, shares held by a person who has an interest in more than 5% of the shares of the issuer are not regarded as being in public hands unless the Listing Committee determines that such a person can for the purposes of this condition be included in the public. We suggest that the vagueness of the law (in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania) and the poor enforcement of the mandatory share buy-back regulation (in Latvia), at least in part, are deliberate. Given the concentration of ownership, most companies would be forced to de-list under a strict enforcement of the rule. Also, such a rule would essentially close down the market for hostile takeovers and erase any possibility for controlling owners to capitalize the control rent.
Defining the Corporate Governance Problem
The corporate governance system provides a set of mechanisms designed to control the fundamental agency problem between management and shareholders. These Most of the world never went through the dispersion of shareholdings, and as we have suggested these countries are unlikely to go through it any time soon. Given that a class of professional managers yet has to emerge, and that management in any case cannot be expected to be independent in heavily concentrated ownership structures, the main conflict in these firms will be between controlling shareholders and minority investors. It is in this perspective that we have to revisit some key tradeoffs in the regulation of corporate governance: between managerial initiative and investor protection; between the interests of large blockholders and those of minority investors; and between minority investor protection and the market for corporate control.
Before discussing these tradeoffs there is also the perennial issue of the appropriate balance between "shareholder value" and considerations for other stakeholders will also remain important given the heritage in the countries. In some Central and Eastern
European countries a heritage of employee ownership and strong role for unions and local community interests are a feature of corporate decision-making. In others unions 22 See the discussion in Section 3.3.
are much weaker than in Western Europe. There are no simple recipes for how to strike the right balance, but the particular stakeholder tradition inherited from socialist times and early phases of transition will most likely leave sediments in corporate governance for years to come. Many stakeholders matter to the success of a corporation, and much of the managerial challenge lies in balancing off these different interests. But there are important advantages to relatively simple measures of corporate performance, and shareholders are more likely to agree on such objectives.
Shareholders are also the only stakeholder group that does not have a collective exit option (as long as the firms is a going concern); any shareholder that wants to leave the firm has to find a buyer of his share.
The classic corporate governance conflict is that between management and shareholders. Early contributors to the corporate governance literature in the United
States worried about the increasing dispersion of shareholdings and the increasing discretion of managers (Berle and Means, 1932) . Much of the regulatory response in this country has been about trying to trade off the benefits of increased discretion for managerial incentives against the protection of shareholders. With too much protection managers would have little incentives and room to use their initiative to improve the performance of the firm; with too little protection investors would not contribute sufficient funds or demand very high interest (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997 ). As we have argued, this is unlikely to be the key tradeoff in Central and Eastern European economies in the forseeable future. Managers cannot be expected to play the same independent role in a company controlled by a large owner as in the corporation with dispersed shareholders. To the extent that management has been separated from ownership the main issue is excessive intervention by the controlling shareholder, not by minority investor, in management.
The main conflict is thus between the controlling shareholders and minority investors.
Only controlling shareholders have sufficient incentives to monitor management, but they may also be able to extract private benefits, even at the expense of minority investors. As we have seen, many countries allow various mechanisms for separating control from ownership, e.g., through dual class shares or pyramiding, in order to encourage monitoring. But these mechanisms also increase the incentives to dilute the claims of other shareholders. In environments with weak institutions, like most transition countries, regulation alone will not be sufficient to constrain management, increasing the need for stronger corporate governance.
Regulatory measures could be designed to promote takeovers by shifting the takeover premium to the bidder (e.g., the so-called break-through rule proposed by a recent expert group appointed by the Commission). While such measures have desirable features in terms of promoting hostile takeovers, they may also undermine the incentives to hold controlling blocks, and thus weaken shareholder monitoring of management (Berglof and Burkart, 2002) . With strongly concentrated ownership and control markets for takeovers and proxy fights are likely to be ineffective in any case.
Moreover, while takeovers may help corporate governance, they also suffer from their own agency problems. In the transition countries, we should not expect too much from the market for corporate control as a disciplining device.
Large blockholders and the market for corporate control are not the only mechanisms for disciplining managers. Other devices include shareholder litigation and proxy fights, but they are unlikely to be effective, or reliable, in the transition environment with weak courts and concentrated shareholdings. Boards of directors cannot be expected to play an independent role in companies controlled by a single shareholder.
Executive compensation schemes are yet another way to align the incentives of management with those of the firm. However, as the Enron experience suggests, it is a highly imperfect mechanism, particularly in transition environments where input numbers are highly volatile and even more subject to manipulation by managers than in developed market economies.
The corporate governance systems will have to rely on active involvement and monitoring by large blockholders for the foreseeable future, even after the emergence of a class of professional managers. With the possible exception of what can be achieved through executive compensation schemes, none of the other mechanisms are likely to provide significant leverage on management any time soon. In the mediumrun there is some hope that large commercial banks will start to play a more active role in financing and monitoring companies, but this has not happened yet. Minority protection is important to attract outside capital, but it may reduce the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control. In particular, the mandatory bid rule requiring that any control premium is shared equally among the controlling owner and minority shareholders could seriously reduce the probability of a hostile offer. When ownership is dispersed, no control premium is paid and the mandatory bid rule essentially has no effect. But when ownership is concentrated, this rule intended to protect minority investors against diluting takeovers unfortunately increases the cost of a takeover, potentially even enough to make the minority shareholders worse off.
Sales of large blocks are desirable and critical to successful corporate restructuring in these countries, but the mandatory bid rule essentially closes down the market for block trades. Moreover, since a mandatory bid rule reduces the likelihood that a bid will be made in the first place, it entrenches the incumbent controlling owner, and diminishes any disciplining role the market for corporate control may have. Given that transition countries will have concentrated ownership for the foreseeable future, the mandatory bid rule, at least not in its strict form leaving no control premium, does not seem to be part of an optimal regulatory environment. Several of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe seem, however, to have found ways to mitigate the effects of these, largely externally, imposed rules.
In constraining controlling owners and managers, lawmakers can intervene or rely on self-regulation among the concerned parties. Both methods have their costs and benefits, and the tradeoff between them has been accentuated by the recent flurry of voluntary corporate governance codes. Self-regulation probably has greater legitimacy among those constrained by the rules and is very flexible in a rapidly changing technological environment where government rules easily become obsolete.
Government regulation has more bite and probably broader legitimacy in the rest of society. Unfortunately, self-regulation is unlikely to be effective in weak transition environments, but enforcement of government regulation is also more unreliable.
Nevertheless, government regulation is necessary to convince large, particularly foreign, investors to commit substantial amounts of capital. Self-regulation is also unlikely to work unless there is government regulation as a strong credible threat in case compliance breaks down. The focus of regulation should be on reducing the scope for fraud exploiting minority shareholders.
The many corporate governance codes have served other purposes. They have been quite useful in promoting debate and thus fostered awareness of the underlying issues.
They have also allowed some degree of commitment to good behavior. There should be some cost to breaking a well-specified code rather than some general ethical rule.
Perhaps most importantly the codes serve as useful reference points in bargaining on boards of directors and between controlling shareholders and minority investors.
Managers and controlling owners will have to motivate when they deviate from the standard, thus shifting status quo in the discussion. Historically, codes were a first step towards binding regulation (cf., for example, the US experience (Coffee, 2001) ).
Government regulation can be challenged in courts and thus promotes court development. Under both forms of regulation independent media plays an important role in bringing out abuses and supporting enforcement. In many of the Central and Eastern European countries investigative business journalism is still in its infancy.
In spite of tremendous institutional differences corporate governance codes around the world are remarkably similar, across developed, transition and developing countries.
This observation suggests either that there are considerable costs to deviating from these codes, but also that the codes are not (at least not yet) very effective. It also highlights yet another tradeoff, that between harmonization and self-definition of corporate governance problem. Codes are easy to import, even easier than recommendations and binding regulations from governments, but they are much harder to enforce if they do not come out of self-definition. Simple emulation will not foster such a process, and may in fact even be counterproductive to corporate governance reform when rules are not adjusted to local conditions. We argue that selfdefinition is, in fact, part of the solution to the problem of enforcement. When legislators and enforcing agencies have been part of the genesis of the rules they are more likely to continue develop and enforce the rules. Just as in the individual firm, imported codes can serve as a useful reference point in the national regulatory process; any deviations would have to be explicitly motivated by local conditions.
Conclusions
Recent scandals like Enron and Worldcom have shown the externalities imposed by governance failures in individual companies on the entire financial system in a country with highly developed institutions like the United States. The emerging capitalist systems are facing similar but far more difficult challenges. In an increasingly global financial system these fledgling regulatory environments are competing for international savings. But the ability to attract foreign capital, both direct and portfolio investment, is only one important consideration in the design of a financial system, but it must also generate domestic savings. In this system corporate governance is critical. We have outlined the many difficult tradeoffs involved in corporate governance reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Our main message is that ownership and control is and will remain concentrated for the foreseeable future, and regulatory intervention should focus on eliminating outright fraud while maintaining the incentives for entrepreneurship and large shareholder monitoring. In particular, there is a strong need to make the emerging control structures and what controlling owners do more transparent.
Regulators must recognize that large blockholders are an important feature of the corporate governance system once ownership and management separate. Controlling shareholders are a second-best response to weak legal institutions. Efforts to get rid of large holdings would lead to more managerial discretion in an environment where there are very few other disciplining mechanisms and where sediments of a specific stakeholder culture may obfuscate corporate goals. Moreover, such attempts would not go unanswered. They would most likely lead to further de-listings and increased opaqueness. The market for corporate control is critical to promote transfers of controlling blocks but given the high ownership concentration these transactions are unlikely to take place against the desire of the controlling shareholders and managers.
Strict enforcement of mandatory bid rules would essentially shut down the market for corporate control and further entrench incumbent management and controlling owner.
Empowering (minority) shareholders is still important, since it promotes liquidity in stock markets, which, in turn, provide capital and valuable information for corporate governance and restructuring. Corporate governance codes are useful, but more binding legislation is necessary. Perhaps the single most important objective is to increase transparency, not only about ownership and control structures, but also about what managers and controlling owners do, in particular how they reward each other.
In this regard the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have an opportunity to leapfrog the developed markets on the European continent where transparency is still wanting (Becht et al., 1999) . Even strengthening the legal recourse of minority investors could eventually help promote good corporate governance. In the longer term the combined effects of these mechanisms can also help improve contestability of control, critical in disciplining controlling shareholders and managers and giving new owners and management teams an opportunity to bring about much needed restructuring.
